

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 22, 1995

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall vote No. 390, I inadvertently missed the vote. Had I been present, I would have voted "no."

THE CRISIS IN BOSNIA

HON. GERALD B.H. SOLOMON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 22, 1995

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker. I commend to the attention of Members a thoughtful statement concerning the crisis in Bosnia that was delivered on May 29, 1995 at the North Atlantic Assembly by our good friend and colleague, Representative DOUG BEREUTER:

NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON
BOSNIA

Thank You, Mr. President. The events which have led this Assembly to undertake today's special debate on Bosnia are both compelling and tragic. At the outset, I know I can speak for the Congress and the American people in one regard and that is to convey our grave concern for the safety of all personnel serving for the UN in Bosnia. On this America's Memorial Day our thoughts and prayers are now especially for those troops who have been detained as hostages or who are under imminent threat by the Bosnian Serbs. We especially convey our condolences to the families and the French government for the French soldiers who were so recently killed in the line of duty.

There is very little consensus on the situation in Bosnia but strong views in America as in your own countries.

The Clinton Administration supports the view that UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia. Present circumstances may dictate that UNPROFOR will have to leave, but America's view is that every effort must be made to keep the UN there—but I stress under acceptable conditions.

We must all recognize that there has always been a tension and a contradiction between the tough mandates adopted at the UN Security Council in New York and the hard realities on the ground in Bosnia. The current crisis dictates that we have to decide once and for all whether UNPROFOR is a peacekeeping force or a peace making force, i.e., an enforcer. As we tragically learned in Somalia it cannot be both.

We must work together within the UN framework to firm-up the UNPROFOR mandate and eliminate its ambiguities to the extent possible. We must examine the increasingly cumbersome and dangerous relationship between NATO and the UN in Bosnia; it is disastrously slow and obviously, in my personal view, Mr. Akashi is not the right man for his position. Specifically, we must allow military commanders on the ground more decision-making discretion, especially concerning the disposition, safety and well-being of peacekeeping troops. I have confidence in General Rupert Smith and his key multinational officers.

Many countries represented here today have troops serving honorably in Bosnia. I want to reassure those colleagues here that we in the U.S. Congress, despite criticism you may have heard from time to time from individual Members, both prominent and ob-

scure—despite that criticisms, the Congress and informed Americans remain very appreciative and sensitive to the extremely difficult but very necessary role these UNPROFOR troops have assumed in Bosnia. France and Britain, in particular, have played a central role in this operation and their troops have suffered accordingly.

As our NATO allies, you have our support and solidarity and will continue to have it as your troops try to conduct their difficult mission in Bosnia.

America is fully engaged as your ally in NATO in the advanced contingency planning to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia if this proves necessary. If NATO needs to assist the UN in withdrawing from Bosnia, I would urge that NATO goes in with overwhelming force and that the operation is executed swiftly. We are committed by our President to provide approximately half of the personal for such an operation.

Certainly we must recognize that UNPROFOR cannot stay in Bosnia forever. The force has already been there for three years. It may be that the parties in Bosnia no longer want UNPROFOR to stay or that they will continue to try to manipulate UNPROFOR for their own interests. In November, if UNPROFOR has not already been withdrawn, and if the parties have not agreed on the outline of a peace settlement, we should then consider not renewing the current mandate as it expires. In approaching that decision, however, we also must recognize that the prospect of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR may influence the warring sides in Bosnia to come to a negotiated settlement. Or withdrawing UNPROFOR may only be the prelude to a total bloodbath that will be appalling to the civilized world. Which will it be? There have never been any single or easy solutions to the conflict in Bosnia. There are none in the current crisis either.

The American Government strongly believes that despite the stark conditions in Bosnia we must keep the negotiating track open. The work of the Contact Group should continue. Together as allies we must keep striving to find a negotiated solution to the conflict acceptable to all sides. Hopeless as that seems, we cannot give up, but neither should we delay remedies to the current dangers faced by UNPROFOR and civilians while we seek a negotiated settlement.

In conclusion, I would say that the present turn of events in Bosnia makes it plain that our policies and the means provided to conduct them are not bringing the conflict in Bosnia closer to an end. It seems plain that either we alter our objectives and strategy, or we must escalate UNPROFOR's resources and their use.

Our policymakers, myself included, do understand that the Bosnian ethnic conflict or civil war is probably not an isolated situation. The aftermath of the age of Communism and the end of the Cold War has left Europe and other continents with hundreds of situations of potential ethnic conflict or severe civil strife, many of them with the potential of being as serious as Bosnia. How then do we send the right signal to those elsewhere in Europe, the parts of the former Soviet Union and Africa that the West can and will take measures necessary to ensure that there is not a violent spiralling or ethnically driven violence in or around Europe?

I do not have an answer for this question, but I would like to close with an observation by Robert Tucker, a distinguished American professor of diplomacy, "Interdependence itself is not constitutive of order. . . . Interdependence creates the need for greater order because it is as much a source of conflict as consensus."

Some may therefore submit that the UN and the international community has been

couching its strategy for the Bosnian conflict in a desire to control and limit the violence. While that strategy may have worked to some degree within Bosnia, it does not address the question of avoiding further conflict driven by ethnic hatreds elsewhere. And in the long run, such a strategy concedes the game to the party that is willing to be the worst thug on the block.

Quite understandably a great many people in my country, and in yours as well, believe that it is the parties in the Yugoslavian conflict themselves who ultimately will decide whether to live or die with one another, in other words they have concluded that we cannot force peace in Bosnia among people whose deep hatred sets them to kill each other. In the end, the most the international community may be able to say about Bosnia is that we tried, albeit haltingly, inadequately, and timidly. But humanity demands that the effort be made.

The American delegation supports the resolution.

TRIBUTE TO NAVY LT. COMDR.
TOM DEITZ

HON. ROBERT K. DORNAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 22, 1995

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize Lt. Comdr. Tom Deitz—our resident Navy Seal and special operations warfare specialist here in Congress—for his distinguished service to the U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Navy, and the entire nation as the Special Operations Command legislative liaison for Naval Special Warfare programs. In this capacity, Tom quickly established a solid reputation with both members of Congress and their staff due to his extensive knowledge of all special operations issues. Fresh from his daring and highly decorated exploits in the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm, Tom was able to give us an insider's view to the unique and powerful special operations force which we in Congress have worked so hard to support during defense budget deliberations.

Tom Deitz has played a vital part in building this congressional support by earning our trust and respect. His effective work on Capitol Hill is legendary. Because of Tom's dedication and commitment to excellence, the U.S. Navy Seals, the U.S. Special Operations Command, and the entire Department of Defense will long reap the benefits of his tenure on Capitol Hill. All of my colleagues and I bid Tom, his wife Pam, and their son and future Seal Tyler, a fond farewell. Good luck and Godspeed at your next assignment at Seal Central on Coronado Island, California.

RECOGNITION OF SENIOR CHIEF
GROSS

HON. WALTER B. JONES, JR.

OF NORTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 22, 1995

Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize and honor Ship's Serviceman Senior Chief David Gross, as he retires upon completion of over 23 years of faithful service to our Nation.